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Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 29 (July 27, 2007)1 
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW-WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO 
   
Summary 
 
Petition granted in part and denied in part for a writ of quo warranto challenging a 
chief justice’s authority to require another district judge to meet with a committee of 
judges, to remove and reassign that judge’s criminal caseload, and to temporarily bar that 
judge from entering the courthouse. 
 
Disposition/ Outcome 
 
Chief Judge Hardcastle’s actions in appointing a three-judge committee and in 
removing Judge Halverson’s criminal cases constituted a proper exercise of her 
administrative authority; a writ of quo warranto is not warranted to address those issues.  
However, with respect to a May 10th order banning Judge Halverson from the justice 
center until she cooperates. Chief Judge Hardcastle overstepped her authority.   
 
Factual and Procedural History  
 
In 2006, the people of Clark County elected Elizabeth Halverson to a district court 
judgeship.  Three moths after assuming duties, Halverson asserts that in an article Judge 
Hardcastle, chief judge of the Eight Judicial District, commented on the judge’s 
performance.  During the next several weeks, events took place which led to the instant 
quo warranto proceeding. 
 
The first event occurred when Chief Judge Hardcastle asked s three-judge panel to 
assist Halverson’s transition on the bench after alleged reports that she met with jurors in 
a criminal matter outside the presence of counsel’s presence and often demeaned her 
staff.  The panel submitted reports regarding Halverson’s behavior with her staff and 
inappropriate comments while conducting trials.  The committee of judges explained to 
Halverson the “specifics” of her alleged improper behavior and she became “defensive.”  
Despite Chief Judge Hardcastle’s purported beneficial intentions, Judge Halverson 
viewed the committee’s review of her and her staff as punitive.   
 
The second event occurred when Chief Judge Hardcastle reassigned Halverson’s 
criminal caseload to other incoming judges, each of whom had extensive experience in 
criminal law, and gave Halverson a “civil-only” caseload.  While Halverson “was 
initially receptive” to the reassignment, she later protested arguing that the change was 
punitive.   
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The third event occurred when Halverson was barred form the Clark County 
Regional Justice Center.  Halverson personally hired two “bodyguards” to secure the 
office for her and her staff without the informing court administration or court security.  
There was an unauthorized search in Judge Halverson’s chambers but the personal 
bodyguards stopped the group before entering the office.  The following day, Hardcastle 
met with the three-judge committee and the court administration to discuss the previous 
day’s events.  They all agreed that the bodyguards should be removed from the 
courthouse and that Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department should be present when 
the removal occurred. The removal did not take place and the police left without incident.  
Halverson insisted that she was allowed to retain private bodyguards.  She later was 
asked to meet with the judge committee, but refused because she was not contacted 
through her attorney.  Chief Judge Hardcastle, the presiding judges, and the court 
administration agreed that Halverson and her bodyguards should be removed until 
Halverson agreed to meet with them to discuss everyone’s security concerns.   
 
On May 10, 2007, Hardcastle entered an administrative order prohibiting 
Halverson and her two private bodyguards from entering the Regional Justice Center.  
Judge Halverson contends that she was not notified nor had the opportunity to be heard 
before being banned from the building.  Chief Judge Hardcastle ordered that, “in order to 
protect public safety and to prevent further interference with the orderly administration of 
justice in the courthouse,” Halverson, effective immediately, was barred from the justice 
center until she agreed to meet with the three-judge committee.   
 
Halverson’s petition for writ of quo warranto followed these events, in which 
Judge Halverson specifically challenges Judge Hardcastle’s authority to do three things: 
(1) require her to meet with the three-judge committee concerning her judicial and 
nonjudicial activities; (2) remove and reassign her criminal caseload; (3) order that she be 
barred from the justice center until she agrees both to meet with the committee of judges 
and to discontinue her “disruptive behavior and threats to courthouse security.”   
 
Discussion 
 
A chief judge is authorized to administratively coordinate “the smooth running of 
court business,” however, all elected judges enjoy coextensive and concurrent jurisdiction 
and power, and the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline enjoys exclusive authority 
over formal judicial discipline.  Thus, if the chief judge’s administrative powers include 
the evaluation of a fellow judge’s conduct and rendering punishment against a judge, 
such action will interfere with other judicial officers and the Nevada Commission on 
Judicial Discipline. 
 
The chief judge is broadly authorized to carry out the district courts’ inherent 
authority to ensure the orderly administration of judicial business.  As long as the chief 
judge follows relevant statutes and court rules, he or she may convene committees of 
judges to review another judge’s conduct in processing cases and even remove or 
reassign cases.  Also, under certain circumstances, she may properly exercise her 
supervisory authority over court business to ban another judge from the courthouse. 
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However, her supervisory authority is limited to emergency circumstances that were not 
demonstrated here. 
 
In order to accomplish a chief justice’s administrative obligations, the chief judge 
“must” appoint a committee of judges so that the committee could attempt to address 
issues relating to Judge Halverson’s conduct on and off the bench.  However, a chief 
judge has no authority to require a judge to meet with the committee to discuss her 
performance and then ban her from the courthouse.  The proper remedy, absent an 
emergency situation, would be wither with Nevada Supreme Court, as “administrative 
head of the court system,” or, if appropriate, with the judicial discipline commission.   
 
A chief judge does not have either express authority or inherent authority in 
banning a judge from the courthouse.  In the absence or properly adopted security rules or 
other explicitly states authority permitting the chief judge to ban other judges from the 
courthouse, no express authority for such action has been shown.  A chief judge may not 
exercise his or her inherent authority to bar other district judges from performing their 
judicial duties, except in emergency situations in which no other adequate means exist to 
preserve court security or reasonably necessary court functions.  Chief Judge Hardcastle 
has not demonstrated that such an emergency authorized the use of her inherent powers to 
immediately ban Judge Halverson from the justice center in order to protect the proper 
administration of justice, or that she had not adequate means by which to do so.  
Hardcastle exceeded her powers as chief judge, effectively intruding upon Halverson’s 
exercise of judicial functions.   
 
The reassignment of criminal cases was appropriate because the chief judge can 
do so out of valid “convenience” and “necessity” reasons.  Halverson had more 
experience in the civil law arena, and allowing her more time to become proficient on 
criminal procedure could help the court to operate more efficiently.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Petition for a writ of quo warranto is granted in part and denied in part.  Chief 
Judge Hardcastle’s actions in appointing a three-judge committee and in removing Judge 
Halverson’s criminal cases constituted a proper exercise of her administrative authority, a 
writ of quo warranto is not warranted to address those issues.  However, with respect to a 
May 10th order banning Judge Halverson from the justice center until she cooperates. 
Chief Judge Hardcastle overstepped her authority.    
 
 
